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FUNCTIONAL DISCOUNTS UNDER THE
ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
FRED BARTENSTMIN, JR.*
The Robinson-Patman Act, amending the Clayton Act, was passed
by Congress in June, 1936.1 Its intent was to strengthen federal anti-
trust laws forbidding price discriminations injurious to competition or
tending to create a monopoly. The statute's language, unfortunately,
is vague and ambiguous, and many sellers found it difficult to deter-
mine whether their pricing systems met its requirements.2 Among those
finding no easy answer to their questions were sellers classifying their
purchasers by function, and charging different prices to the different
classes.
Functional Discounts
Producers selling through established trade channels normally
classify customers as wholesalers, retailers, and ultimate consumers. In
accordance with the place each class occupies in marketing, retailers
are given a discount from consumer prices and wholesalers, a discount
from retailer prices. These price reductions accorded distributors are
known in commercial practice as "functional" or "trade" discounts.
They are granted on the basis of the marketing function performed by
the buyer in serving particular classes of trade-not on quantity of
purchase, time of payment, or any other consideration.8 In modem
marketing, sellers often serve more specialized types of customers than
do traditional wholesalers and retailers., They, too, normally receive
functional discounts to accord with the distribution function they
perform.
Producers in some cases will sell their goods not only to distribu-
*Associated with the Legal Department of Merck 8: Co., Inc.
249 Stat. 1528, 15 U. S. C. A. § 13 (1941).
2"Sometimes I doubt whether we ever needed the Robinson-Patman law, with
all its elusive uncertainty. I have thought that the Sherman Act, properly inter-
preted and administered, would have remedied all the evils meant to be cured."
Judge Lindley, United States v. The New York Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Com-
pany Inc. et al., 67 F. Supp. 626, 677 (E. D. Ill. 1946). See also H. T. Austern, Re-
quired Competitive Injury and Permitted Meeting of Competition, Robnson-Pat-
man Act Symposium, CCH 63 (1947).
gAlexander, Surface, Elder and Alderson, Marketing 424 (1944).
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tors, but to purchasers who fabricate, process, consume in production,
or otherwise change the character of goods before further sale or use.
Such customers often are classified on the basis of their function-what
they do with the goods-and each class may pay different prices. These
price differences are not usually referred to in commercial language
as "functional" or "trade" discounts. They are similar to such dis-
counts, however, because they are price differences based solely on the
functions performed by classes of customers. Since, as will be seen, they
are subject to the same general standards under the Robinson-Patman
Act, they will be considered functional discounts for purposes of this
discussion.
Impact of the Robinson-Patman Statute
It is not comforting to sellers to know that Congress had con-
sidered and refused to allow specific exemptions for functional dis-
counts in the Robinson-Patman Act. The original Patman bill in both
the Senate and House had authorized differentials in prices "as between
purchasers depending solely upon whether they purchase for resale
to wholesalers, to retailers, or to consumers, or for use in further manu-
facture. ' 4 The House Judiciary Committee, apparently recognizing
that modern-day marketing is usually a maze of overlapping functions
and integrated operations, added the following provision: "For the
purpose of such classification of customers as wholesalers or jobbers, or
retailers, the character of selling of the purchaser and not the buying
shall determine the classification." Where a buyer does both a whole-
sale and a retail business, he shall "be classified (i) as a wholesaler on
purchases for sale to retail dealers and (2) as a retailer on purchases
for sale to consumers."5
The Act in its final form contained none of this language. With-
out official explanation, Congress deleted the sanction for wholesale,
retail and manufacturer price differentials, 6 and passed a law the per-
tinent provisions of which are as follows:
" It shall be unlawful either directly or indirectly, to dis-
criminate in price between different purchasers of commodities
of like grade and quality, where the effect of such discrimina-
'Sen. Rep. No. 15o2, 74th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1936); H. R. Rep. No. 2287, 7 4th
Cong., 2nd Sess. (1936); Zorn and Feldman, Business Under the New Price Laws
168 (1937).
5H. R. Rep. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1936).
Deletion seems to have resulted from the pressure of farm groups who feared
the language would deprive farm cooperatives of wholesale discounts. 80 Cong. Rec.
811 3, 8117-18, 8122-23.
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tion may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, de-
stroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants
or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with
customers or either of them: Provided, that nothing herein con-
tained shall prevent differentials which make only due allow-
ance for differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery
resulting from the differing methods or quantities in which such
commodities are to such purchasers sold or delivered "7
These words differ from those of the old Clayton Act in that they
specifically cover competitive injury to the seller's customers. That Act
had referred only to competitive injury "in any line of commerce,"
and functional discounts had been given specific court sanction on the
ground that the statute did not comprehend injury to competition be-
tween the seller's customers, but only between the seller and his com-
petitors.8 Whatever the meaning of the words, "in any line of com-
merce," subsequently interpreted more broadly in a decision not deal-
ing with functional discounts,9 there was no doubt that the Robinson-
Patman Act was concerned with the effect of price discrimination at
customer levels, and that functional discounts were required to accord
with its provisions.
There was the possibility, of course, that Congress had intended
all discounts granted on the basis of function to be justified by cost
savings to the seller. Wholesalers generally buy in larger quantity and
less frequently than retailers, and industrial consumers generally buy
in larger quantities and less frequently than wholesalers. Cost savings
thus arising from the economies of large-scale sale and delivery are un-
doubtedly a factor in the according of functional discounts. But they
are not the sole factor; the discounts customarily are given on orders
of any size.10 As stated in the House Judiciary Committee Report on
the proposed Robinson-Patman bill, "wholesalers frequently find it
necessary to supplement existing stock by additional purchases in smal-
ler quantities and the above exemption [for wholesale discounts] per-
mits a wholesaler to be accorded wholesale prices on these smaller pur-
chases as incident to his business, without the seller having to accord
7Clayton Act, Sec. 2 (a); 49 Stat. 1526, 15 U. S. C. A. § 13 (1941).
sMennen Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 288 Fed. 774 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923),
cert. den., 262 U. S. 759 (i923); National Biscuit Co. v. Federal Trade Commission,.
299 Fed. 733 (C. C. A. 2d, 1924), cert den., 266 U. S. 613 (1924).
DGeorge Van Camp & Sons Co. v. American Can Co., 278 U. S. 245 (1929).
"Alexander, Surface, Elder and Alderson, Marketing 424 (1944); Werne, Busi-
ness and the Robinson Patman Law, A Symposium 181 (1938).
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them at the same time on the whole body of purchases in similar quan-
tities on sales direct to retailers. This protects the usefulness of the
wholesaler in serving retailers dependent upon him for their source of
supply."'1
Early Opinzons
Lawyers and businessmen contemplating the statute and its back-
ground in 1936, however, could not bring themselves to believe that
Congress had meant to outlaw, as such, discounts given customers
properly classified according to function. There was nothing in the
legislative history of the Act to indicate that such discounts were con-
sidered harmful. It was noted that the Robinson-Patman bill had been
supported by groups of independent wholesalers and retailers as a pro-
tective measure against alleged abuses in the large-scale buying prac-
tices of retail chain stores. 12 It seemed unlikely that legislation these
groups sponsored would become an instrument to limit the pricing
system on which their livelihood depended.
The usual opinion was that Congress had not considered functional
discounts injurious to competition per se, and that the deletion of the
specific exemption for them was a recognition that they needed no ex-
emption under the statute. Before competition can be affected between
buyers, they must compete; buyers compete when they offer their pro-
ducts for sale to the same customers; buyers properly classified accord-
ing to their function do not sell substantially to the same customers.
Different prices charged buyers in different functions thus would not be
forbidden discrimination. The same reasoning would apply, of course,
to those customers buying for industrial consumption, processing,
fabrication into other products, or for use in any other non-competi-
tive function. Thus, although functional discounts were price dif-
ferences, they were not considered, without more, a cause of the evils
at which the legislation was aimed.13
11H. R. Rep. No. 2287, 7 4 th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1936).
12The Robinson-Patman Act, Its History and Probable Meaning, The Wash-
ington Post 5 (1936); Werne, Business and the Robinson Patman Law, A Symposium
102-104 (1938); Alexander, Surface, Elder and Alderson, Marketing 452 (1944).
13The Robinson-Patman Act, Its History and Probable Meaning, The Wash-
ington Post 11 (1936); Werne, Business and the Robinson Patman Law, A Symposi-
um 134 (1938). It has been noted that a functional discount may not be only a
price difference, covered by § 2(a) of the Clayton Act, but a payment for a service
performed by the buyer, covered by §2(d) of the Act. While it may be true in theory
that the seller is "buying" a distribution service for his product, the application of
§2(d) would involve functional discounts in standards that would effectively change
their character. The Federal Trade Commission has not indicated that it con-
[Vol. IV
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On more specific questions of the statute's application, the opin-
ions were not as definite.
The meaning of the word "either" in "with customers of either of
them," seemed of remote effect: a discount given to all wholesalers
would have an equal effect on retailers and should not adversely affect
competition between them. Some commentators noted, however, that
a functional discount might be so large as to permit the buyer receiv-
ing it to pass on a part of the saving, and place his customers in a bet-
ter position than the direct customers of the seller. This problem, how-
ever, was looked on as not likely to occur.14 Also, it seemed, a function-
al discount ordinarily would not affect competition between sellers
granting the discount.15 In absence of collusion, the giving or increas-
ing of such discounts would be equivalent to price reduction at one
competitive level, and promotive of competition.
Since the Act primarily had been aimed at chain retailers, it was
suspected that prices charged retail chain stores should correspond
to prices charged independent retailers unless a difference could be
justified by cost savings. The same was true of mail-order houses, de-
partment stores, and consumer cooperatives-despite the fact that
all these forms of mass distribution frequently incorporate both whole-
sale and retail functions. In selling a customer acting both as a whole-
saler and a retailer in his reselling activity, the seller was felt to be un-
der some form of obligation to apportion the discounts in a manner
corresponding to actual function.
16
Administrative and Court Interpretation
It has now been eleven years since the Robinson-Patman Act was
promulgated and the lawyer is expected to be able to advise his client
siders §2(d) applicable. Van Cise, Functional Prices, Robmson-Patman Act Sym-
posium, CCH 89-0go (947).
"Zorn and Feldman, Business Under the New Price Laws 176 (1937); Shipman,
Two Years' Experience Under the Robinson-Patman Act, reprint from Oil, Paint
& Drug Reporter i3 (1938).
'5Injury to competition with the seller is a basis for finding a price discrimma-
tion illegal. E. B. Muller Co. et al v. Federal Trade Commission, 33 F. T. C. 24;
i42 F. (2d) 511 (C. C. A. 6th, 1944); Samuel H. Moss, Inc. v. Federal Trade Com-
mission, 548 F. (2d) 378, 9 L. ed. 41 (C. C. A. 2d, 1945).
26For publications issued after passage of the Robinson-Patman Act dealing
with its probable effects, see Patman, The Robinson-Patman Act (1938); The Rob-
inson-Patman Act, Its History and Probable Meaning, Washington Post (1936);
Werne, Business and the Robinson-Patman Law, A Symposium (1938); Zorn and
Feldman, Business Under the New Price Laws (1937); McNair, Marketing Functions
and the Robinson-Patman Act, 4 Law and Contemporary. Problems 334 (i937);
Learned and Isaacs, The Robinson-Patman Law, Some Assumptions and Excep-
947]
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about the legal status of the functional discount and the permissible
limits of its use. The penalty of misunderstanding is severe. Violation
involves the seller in stipulations with or orders from the Federal
Trade Commission, and in the possibility of criminal fines,1T treble-
damage suits by customers,18 and the unfavorable publicity attendant
upon all of these contingencies.' 9
On investigating the field, however, it will be found that there have
been no direct court decisions on the legality of functional pricing
since enactment of the Robinson-Patman Act. Further, it will be seen
that few unqualified conclusions can be drawn from actions of the
Federal Trade Commission in refusing to file complaints under the
amended Clayton Act, in dismissing complaints, or in accepting stip-
ulations. There have been a number of such actions but specific rea-
sons were not usually assigned by the Commission.2 0 Practically the
only available source of precedent is the formal record of cease and
desist orders issued by the Commission dealing with practices found
illegal under the Act. These records, it will be found, often contain
inadequate explanation by the Federal Trade Commission of the
theory and reasoning supporting its actions.
Since the lawyer, however, cannot solve problems of pricing policy
by not knowing the answers, he must apply himself to the record of
administrative enforcement for whatever it may offer. The following
orders have dealt with the problem of the functional discount and its
application under the Robinson-Patman Act.
tions, Harvard Business Review, Vol. V, No. 2; W L. Thorpe and E. B. George,
Check List of Possible Effects of the Robinson-Patman Act, Dun and Bradstreet,
Inc.
1149 Stat. 1528, 15 U. S. C. A. §13(a) (1941). To date the criminal sanction has
not been invoked. Montague, Sections 2(a) and 2(f) of the Clayton Act as amended
by the Robinson-Patman Act and 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act, Robinson-Patman
Act Symposium, CCH 14 (1946).
1838 Stat. 731, 15 U. S. C. A. §15 (1941). See Elizabeth Arden Sales Corporation
v. Gus Blass Company, i5o F. (2d) 988 (C. C. A. 8th, 1945), cert. den. 66 S. Ct. 231
(1945).
"By the margin of one Justice, The Supreme Court recently denied the addi-
tional sanction of permitting delinquent customers to plead a Robinson-Patman
violation as a defense to an action for payment of a business obligation. Bruce's
Juices Inc. v. American Can Co., United States Supreme Ct., No. 27, April 7, 1947,
CCH Trade Regulation Service, p. 58, 490.
-1A number of dismissals of complaints against functional discounts appeared
in Chairman Ayres' Report to Representative Patman, 81 Congressional Record
12456 (August 25, 1937); Shipman, Two Years' Experience Under the Robinson-
Patman Act, reprint from Oil, Paint, & Drug Reporter (i938).
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Bird & Son, Inc.
Soon after the effective date of the Act, the Federal Trade Commis-
sion justified one of the early prognostications of the writers. It adopted
the rule that the character of the selling-not the buying-determines
whether customers are competing. In dismissing a complaint issued
September 3o, 1936 against Bird & Son, Inc.,2i the Commission held
that a mail-order house, Montgomery-Ward & Co., was competing with
independent retailers in selling floor covering to the public. This be-
ing the case, price advantages given Montgomery-Ward were required
under the Act to be justified by savings in cost resulting from differing
methods or quantities in which the goods were sold or delivered.
22
The Commission by this action reincorporated into the meaning of
the Act a part of the deleted sections of the original bill pertaining to
functional discounts.
Commercial Inoculants Cases
In the Commercial Inoculants cease and desist orders, issued Janu-
ary 12, 1938,23 the Commission propounded another rule originally
incorporated in the deleted sections of the Patman bill-that pertain-
ing to buyers acting in more than one function.
Several companies selling commercial plant inoculants classified
their direct customers as jobbers, retailers, and consumers. The amount
of discount varied with the product and size of the container, but in
all cases the consumer paid the highest price, the retailer a lower price,
and the jobber the lowest price. While these discounts were supposedly
based on different functions, the Commission found that jobbers fre-
quently sold direct to consumers. It also found that the companies sold
to county farm bureaus at prices below the jobbing price, and that
these bureaus sold both to retailers and to consumers.
The Commission made the finding that the difference in prices
charged to customers competitively engaged in reselling inoculants
nBird & Son, Inc., Bird Floor Covering Sales Corporation, Montgomery-Ward &
Company, Inc., 25 F. T. C. 548 (1937).
=The complaint was dismissed primarily on the basis of the seller having re-
vised its selling policy to exclude direct sales to independent retailers. To the ex-
tent that the new policy was not operating after the effective date of the Robinson-
Patman Act, price differences were justified by savings in cost or had no significant
effect on competition.
2'Agricultural Laboratories, Inc., 26 F. T. C. 296 (1938); Hansen Inoculator
Company, Inc., 26 F. T. C. 3o3 (1938); Albert L. Whiting and Lucille D. Whiting,
Trading as the Urbana Laboratories, 26 F. T. C. 312 (1938); The Nitragin Company,
Inc., 26 F. T. C. 32o (1938).
1947]
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to consumers were discriminatory as to that portion so resold, and that
differences in prices charged customers competitively engaged in re-
selling to dealers were discriminatory as to that portion so resold. It
ordered the companies to stop the discriminations.
These laconic findings and order reaffirm the rule adopted in the
Bird and Sons complaint dismissal-that character of the selling de-
termines competition. Additionally, all customers engaged competi-
tively in reselling inoculants to consumers to that extent should be
given the same price; all customers reselling competitively to dealers
to that extent should receive the same price. Nothing is said of the
relationship between the two prices. In its order the Commission thus
acknowledged the existence of the functional price differential, and
by implication recognized its legality. While customer classification for
purposes of giving discounts based on function is apparently permis-
sible, the customer must be correctly classified.
American Oil Company and General Finance, Inc.
The question of how to treat the reseller who operates in two
functions was again considered by the Commission in a 1939 complaint
against the American Oil Company and General Finance, Inc.
24
Amoco sold gasoline to taxi owners pursuant to a "commercial con-
sumer contract" at prices lower than those to independent retail filling
stations. The contract, providing that all products purchased by the
commercial consumer were for his own use only and not for resale to
employees or any other person, was signed by General Finance, Inc.,
owner and controller of several taxi companies in Washington, D.C.,
and operator of a filling station. General Finance disregarded the terms
of the contract and sold some of the gasoline to the public. On learn-
ing of this, Amoco abrogated the "consumer" contact and entered into
a "dealer" contract by which General Finance paid full dealer prices
on receipt of the gas. Because some of the gas was to be used in its
owned or controlled taxis, the dealer's contract was supplemented by
an agreement providing that General Finance would receive a month-
ly credit on gas actually supplied to taxis owned or controlled by it.
The Commission found, and General Finance admitted, that the
gas purchased at the lower price in this manner was actually resold
to the public and to its owned or controlled taxis.
General Finance was found to be in violation of section 2 (f) of
"American Oil Company and General Finance, Inc., 29 F. T. C. 857 (1939).
[Vol. IV
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the Clayton Act by knowingly obtaining a price discrimination; and
Amoco, in violation of section 2 (a) by granting it.
It is difficult to tell from the recorded findings and order whether
the Commission concluded that General Finance could not be deemed
a consumer because it resold gas to its taxis, and that Amoco was aware
of this, or that General Finance received a discrimination because it
resold part of the gas to the public. It may be guessed from the lack of
other findings that in the Commission's mind General Finance was en-
titled to lower prices on gas supplied to its taxis, and that the dis-
crimination resulted from the lower prices on gas resold to the public.
It would appear from the findings, however, that Amoco had tried
completely adequate methods of handling this problem by contractual
arrangement.
If the order was based on Amoco's failure to enforce the contract
provision that the buyer not resell the gasoline to the public, such
contracts would seem to be one way to solve the dilemma of according
functional discounts to multiple-function customers. The contract,
however, would appear to be in restraint of trade. No assurance is
given that such a method would not result in an indictment by the De-
partment of Justice under the Sherman Act, or in another complaint
by the Federal Trade Commission for violation of the unfair trade
practices section of the Federal Trade Commission Act. Presumably,
failure to enforce the contract was not the basis of the Commission's
action.
If the Commission felt that Amoco knew of the violation of the
contract and consented to it, its order against Amoco might be under-
standable. This, however, was not stated in the findings.
In the final analysis, the record of this case is an instance of the
Commission's failure to clarify the issues on a confusing aspect of
Robinson-Patman Act application. By stating the findings in a gen-
eral way, and the order in terms of the statute, it lost the opportunity
to establish a principle or a precedent. A clear decision undoubtedly
would have served a useful purpose to others facing similar problems.
Since the Commission seems to have ordered Amoco to discontinue
discriminations between resellers, and did not refer to the differential
between prices to resellers and commercial consumers, it may be haz-
arded that the case is further precedent for justification of the function-
al discount. It seems to reaffirm the necessity for a seller in some manner
to apportion functional discounts to a multiple-function customer on
the basis of actual operations.
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
Sherwzn-Williams Co.
In a cease and desist order issued against the Sherwin-Williams
Company, January 8, 1943,25 the Commission once more specifically
considered, among others, the problem of functional discounts and
their application to multiple-function customers.
The manufacturers (Sherwin-Williams and its subsidiaries Lowe
Bros. and Lucas & Co.) sold paint products directly to wholesalers
(called distributors), retailers (called dealers), large consumers, and
occasional consumers. The manufacturers regularly allowed "func-
tional discounts to customers who qualified as jobbers, wholesalers,
or distributors." The manufacturers had an established policy and
practice of granting functional discounts "only to jobbers or distri-
butors [wholesalers] and to such dealers [retailers] that perform the
functions of the jobber or distributor, and only in the latter cases, to
the extent that such dealers perform such functions."
The Sherwin-Williams Company did not have any customers
operating exclusively as distributors, but did grant functional dis-
counts to some of its dealers who perform the functions of a distributor.
As a rule, the Company required its dealers acting as distributors to
submit statements after the end of each month showing the total sales
at dealers list prices (manufacturer's price to retailers) 'nade to other
dealers during the preceding month. From such total sales, Sherwin-
Williams deducted the discounts that had been received by the report-
ing dealer with respect to the purchase which had been so resold. The
applicable percentage functional discount was then applied to the
net amount thus obtained to ascertain the sum due the reporting deal-
er as a functional discount for that month. Sherwin-Williams issued a
credit memorandum to the reporting dealer covering the functional
discount allowed for such month.
This method of applying functional discount schedules to multiple-
function customers was not considered a discrimination in violation of
the Robinson-Patman Act, and no order was issued forbidding the
practice.
The Commission found that Lowe Brothers and Lucas allowed
a maximum functional discount of 15% to its distributors. In the case
of dealers performing all the functions of a distributor, the functional
discount, as a rule, bore the same ratio to 15 as the percentage of the
dealer's distributor business bore to his entire business, The functional
2The Sherwin-Williams Co., The Lowe Brothers Co., and John Lucas & Co.,
Inc., 36 F. T. C. 25 (1943).
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discount usually was allowed on the face of the invoice and was based
(after 1938) on the net amount of the dealer's purchases at dealer's
list prices, after deducting quantity or volume discounts.
Lowe Brothers as a rule, accepted the statements of its dealers as
to the percentage that their distributor business bore to their entire
business. Lucas requested its dealer-distributors to submit invoices or
certified statements each month showing the sales of trade sale items
(standard trade-marked products) to other dealers during the preced-
ing month. Some of the dealers complied; others said they would not
do so. As a result, Lucas adopted two forms of distributor agreement,
the first being signed by distributors who were willing to submit in-
voices or certified statements each month; the second being signed by
those who would do no more than certify the percentage of their busi-
ness transacted with retail dealers. Practically all of Lucas' distributors
signed only the second contract, and received functional discounts on
the basis of the representations contained therein.
The Commission found that as a result of these methods of appor-
tioning discounts a substantial number of Lowe's and Lucas' dealer-
distributors received functional discounts with respect to a substantial
portion of the trade sale items resold by them to consumers either di-
rectly or through retail branches owned by them. Moreover, these
dealer-distributors were in competition with other dealer customers and
dealer-distributor customers of the manufacturers. Whether or not the
Commission, however, held such method of apportionment to be in vio-
lation of the Robinson-Patman Act is uncertain. The conclusion at the
end of the order pointedly did not list it among the specific violations,
nor is there a provision in the cease and desist order that the method
is bad under the law. The order, on the other hand, forbids in general
terms any wholesale discount to customers to the extent they act as
retailers. The lawyer is left to his own ingenuity in guessing the full
meaning of the Commission's action.
In any case, it is clear that the Lowe and Lucas method of appor-
tioning discounts is not permissible when it is misused and results in
substantial error. The following instances of discrimination arising
out of such misuse were specifically pointed out in the findings.
Both Lowe Brothers and Lucas allowed wholesale discounts to
several firms who resold only to consumers.
Lowe Brothers gave one of its customers a functional discount on
the supposition that 33Y3% (later 38%) of his business was as a job-
ber. The Commission found that actually such customer sold only
about % of its purchases of such products to other dealers.
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
Lowe Brothers granted a wholesale discount to a reseller on the
supposition that 8o% of his business was as a jobber. The reseller
operated a retail store located in the same building as his wholesale
department, and operated two retail stores in the same city. Approxi-
mately one-half of the paint products bought from Lowe were resold
to occasional consumers through these retail stores; the other half was
sold to dealers located in the same area at Lowe's suggested dealer
prices.
Lucas gave a wholesale discount to one customer who was a paint-
ing contractor using more than one-half of the material in his own
business and reselling the other to consumers.
The practice of allowing functional discounts to customers not per-
forming the related function in these instances was found to injure
competition with the manufacturers themselves and between their
customers. Such practice was ordered discontinued.
In each of these instances where the manufacturer failed to appor-
tion discounts properly, the specific finding was made that the retailers
and consumers receiving the wholesale discount were in competition
with customers of competing manufacturers. It seems clear that a sell-
er who knows that his customer sells 50% of the product at wholesale
and 50% at retail, but authorizes a wholesale discount on 75% of his
purchases will win business away from another seller who apportions
discounts more accurately. The functional discount used in bad faith
or negligently may thus be considered a discrimination resulting in
competitive injury at the primary level-between the seller and his
competitors.
Despite the uncertainty of much of its language, the Commission's
order against Sherwin-Williams and its subsidiaries was an addition
to the precedents established for legality of functional discounts. It
indicated one acceptable method of apportioning such discounts to
multiple-functional customers-that employed by Sherwin-Williams-
and at least implied that the seller will not be held accountable if he
uses apportionment methods-such as those employed by Lowe and
Lucas-if they are applied in good faith and do not result in substan-
tial error.
Subsequently in an order issued May 13, 1944, against the Ameri-
can Art Clay Company26 the Commission gave consideration to "trade
discounts" allowed wholesalers, and ordered them discontinued on the
basis of actual competition between wholesalers and those resellers
not receiving the discount.




In a cease and desist order issued April 14, 1945, against the Morton
Salt Company27 the Commission forbade the seller's discriminating in
price by (a) selling to some wholesalers at prices different from prices
charged other competing wholesalers (b) selling to some retailers at
prices different from prices charged other competing retailers and (c)
selling to some retailers at prices lower than prices charged wholesalers
whose customers compete with such retailers.
While the order was based on the misuse of quantity discounts only,
the Commission again recognized in effect the right to allow discounts
based on function. Wholesalers must be treated alike and retailers
must be treated alike, but nothing in the order requires both classes
to be treated the same way.
The Morton Salt order, however, contained in clear terms what had
been intimated by the Federal Trade Commission in previous orders
issued against the C. F. Sauer Co.2 8 and the Lifesavers Corporaton:29
a retailer should not receive a lower price than a wholesaler if the
wholesaler's customer compete with the retailer. This appears to be a
valid conclusion; otherwige, direct retailers are placed in a substantial-
ly superior competitive position over retailers who buy from whole-
salers. The retailer and wholesaler who receive different prices from the
seller, however, are not in competition. On what basis, it might be
asked, could the Commission find competitive injury between pur-
chasers who do not compete?
Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act states that a price dis-
crimination between purchasers is illegal if it injures competition with
"any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such
discrimination, or with customers of either of them." By the precise
wording of the Statute, the word "either" refers both to the original
seller and to his customer. If injury can be shown to competition be-
tween customers of either of these individuals, an original price dif-
ference, even though charged to noncompeting customers, may be
called illegal. Clearly it was this interpretation of the Statute that the
Commission adopted in holding that, where the difference was not
justified by cost savings, a retailer should not receive a lower price than
a wholesaler selling the retailer's competitors.
="Morton Salt Company, Docket 4319. Order set aside and complaint dismis-
sed by Circuit Court of Appeals, 7th Circuit, May 27, 1947, on basis of Comms-
sion's failure to show quantity discounts were unjustified or that they had an il-
legal effect."
2The C. F. Sauer Co., 33 F. T. C. 812 (1941).
-Life Savers Corporation, 34 F. T. C. 472 (i941).
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Standard Oil Company of Indiana
The latest order dealing with functional discounts was entered Au-
gust 9, 1946, against the Standard Oil Company of Indiana,0 now
pending on review in the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. Some of
the views of the Commission expressed in the findings and order in
this case, it is believed, are inconsistent with those previously ex-
pressed. If the order does not throw actual doubt on the legality of
functional discounts, it at least places practical obstacles in the way
of their use.
The Standard Oil Company sold gasoline at a quoted tank-wagon
price to over three hundred independent retail filling stations in the
Detroit area. At the same time it sold to four so-called "jobbers" in
the same area at tank-car price, 11/2 cents per gallon lower than the
tank-wagon price. These "jobbers" were in the business of reselling
gasoline to filling stations, but according to the Commission's find-
ings, "the Citrin-Kolb Oil Company, Stikeman Oil Company, Inc.,
and Wayne Oil Company sold a substantial portion of the gasoline
purchased by them from the respondent direct to the public through re-
tail service stations owned and operated by them. Ned's Auto Supply
was engaged entirely in the retail sale of gasoline to the public through
its own stations." The Commission also found that "there was no re-
quirement that said jobbers should sell only at wholesale."
The Commission held that each of the "jobbers" by selling to the
public through owned or operated filling stations was to that extent a
retailer, and in competition with other retail filling stations in the
area. Note, for example, the following language in paragraph 8 of
the findings of fact:
"The Commission finds that the price discriminations grant-
ed by the respondent to Ned's Auto Supply Company, both
prior to March 7, 1938, and subsequent thereto, and the price
discriminations granted to Citrn-Kolb Oil Company, Wayne
Oil Company, and Stikeman Oil Company, Inc., on gasoline
sold by them at retail have given a substantial competitive ad-
vantage to these favored dealers zn their retail operations over
other retailers of gasoline, including retailer-customers of the
respondent." [Italics added].
The position taken by the Commission in this finding would sup-
port the conclusion that it was following the policies apparently laid




down in the orders against Bird & Son, the Commercial Inoculant
Companies, the American Oil Company, Sherwin-Williams, and the
Morton Salt Company: character of the selling determines the function
of a reseller, and functional discounts should be apportioned among
multiple-function sellers. The question of whether the "jobbers"
actually stored for, sold to, and invoiced their own filling stations is
not discussed in the findings, although it appears that all deliveries
were made direct to the four "jobbers." It cannot be said, therefore,
that the Commission by this order has "found" all such integrated re-
sellers to be retailers regardless of their operations. The fact is-and
it is important to an understanding of the order-that the four so-
called "jobbers" in this instance were deemed retailers to the extent
they sold through their own filling stations.
Having found the "jobbers" in reality competing with retailers, the
Commission proceeds, as would" be expected, into questions of dif-
ferences in cost of sale or delivery, effect on competitive conditions,
and the meeting of competition.
Had the Commission stopped here, there would be no reason to
feel it had changed its previous views about the legality of functional
discounts or its theories of the economics of distribution.
In its study of the results of the lower price given the four "job-
bers," the Commission discovered one of them, Citrin-Kolb, resold
to independent retailers at less than the Oil Company charged retail-
ers who bought the same gas direct. In the words of the Commission,
"During the period from January 1, 1938, to December 31, 1940, Cit-
rin-Kolb Oil Company sold a million gallons of gasoline annually to
Langer and Cohn, retail service station operators, at i cent per gal-
lon off tank-wagon price and in addition sold another retail service
station operator at 2 cent per gallon off tank-wagon price." The Com-
mission found no evidence that the two other jobbers receiving the
tank-car price sold gasoline to resellers at a price lower than the posted
tank-wagon price charged by respondent to its dealers.
The Citrin-Kolb Oil Company, by passing on part of the price ad-
vantage, enabled Langer and Cohn to sell gasoline to the consuming
public at discounts of as much as two cents per gallon, giving them a
competitive advantage over retailers sold by the Oil Company, and
diverted business from such retailers to Langer and Cohn.
As to this activity, the Commission issued the following order
(paragraph 6):
"IT IS ORDERED that the respondent, Standard Oil Coin-
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pany (Indiana), a corporation, and its officers, representatives,
agents, and employees, directly or through any corporate or
other device in connection with the sale of gasoline in com-
merce, as 'commerce' is defined in the aforesaid Clayton
Act, do forthwith cease and desist from discriminating, directly
or indirectly, in the price of such gasoline of like grade and
quality as among purchasers 6. By selling such gasoline to
any jobber or wholesaler at a price lower than the price which
respondent charges its retailer customers who in fact compete
in the sale and distribution of such gasoline with the retailer-
customers of such jobbers or wholesalers, where such jobber or
wholesaler resells such gasoline to any of its said retailer cus-
tomers at less than respondent's posted tank-wagon price or di-
rectly or indirectly grants to any such retailer-customer any
discounts, rebates, allowances, services or facilities having the
net effect of a reduction in price to the retailer" [Italics added]
When the Commission speaks in this paragraph 6 of a "jobber or
wholesaler," it means a true wholesaler only-one who resells to re-
tailers. It has said, in effect, to the Standard Oil Company of Indiana:
you may not sell to wholesalers at a wholesale discount if any whole-
saler charges a less price to retailers than you yourself charge to re-
tailers. And, furthermore, you will violate the Robinson-Patman Act
in allowing a wholesale discount to a wholesaler if he "directly or in-
directly grants to any such retailer-customer any discounts, rebates, al-
lowances, services, or facilities having the net effect of a reduction in
price to the retailer" below that which you charge competing retailers.
Not before this order had the Federal Trade Commission issued a
similar ruling about functional discounts. In the Morton Salt case it
had upheld the position of the wholesaler in the distribution system by
deciding that a direct customer-retailer should not get a lower price
than a wholesaler where competitive injury results. Here the Commis-
sion found just the opposite-that a direct customer-wholesaler should
not get a lower price than a direct customer-retailer where competitive
injury results.
The competitive injury, according to the Commission, was between
a direct retailer and an indirect retailer. It did not attempt to show
the indirect retailer was a "purchaser" from the Oil Company under
the Act.31 Therefore, the price difference in question must have been
311n a cease and desist order issued in 1937 against the Kraft-Phenix Cheese
Corporation, 25 F. T. C. 537 (1938), the Commission found that a retailer who pur-
chased respondent's goods from wholesalers was a "purchaser" from respondent.
The finding, however, was predicated on the respondent's promoting directly to
the retailer and controlling by resale price maintenance the terms upon which the
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the functional discount charged the direct non-competing customers.
To arrive at a conclusion of illegality under the Robinson-Patman
Act in this situation, the Commission found competitive injury be-
tween customers of the Oil Company's wholesaler. Where competitive
injury is shown, such a result would seem to be justified by the precise
wording of section 2(a) of the Statute referring to "customers of either
of them." This had been the position of early commentators on the
Act who felt that a functional discount might be so large that it would
result in competitive injury between direct and indirect buyers.
There is nothing, however, in the official report of the Indiana
Standard Oil case to show that paragraph 6 of the order was based on
the Oil Company's "jobber" price being too large in relation to its re-
tailer price. As a matter of fact, out of three wholesalers who re-
ceived the jobber price, only one resold to retailers at less than the Oil
Company's own retailer price. Furthermore paragraph 6 did not stip-
ulate that the Oil Company should not grant a large discount to whole-
salers. Nor did it state that the Company should not give a discount
of such size- as to permit the wholesaler to cut resale prices. Instead
the order forbade the functional discount to a jobber where the job-
ber cuts prices to retailers below those charged by the Oil Company.
If this is to be the criterion of a legal functional discount, it follows
that every such discount may become illegal the moment the buyer
cuts prices to his customers.
Did the Commission intend that the seller should control the
wholesaler's price? Maintenance of resale prices, absent fair-trade con-
tracts, is by the dear weight of the decisions a violation not only of the
Sherman Act but of the Federal Trade Commission Act.3 2 It is true
that the seller still may exert some measure of control over resale prices
by the threat of refusing further sale,33 but the chance of successfully
retailer bought. Without exploring further the effect or present status of this doc-
trine, those conditions were not present in the Indiana Standard order.
mDr. Miles Medical Company v. John D. Park & Sons Company, 220 U. S. 373,
31 S. Ct. 376 (19i); Federal Trade Commission v. Beech-Nut Packing Company
257 U. S. 441, 42 S. Ct. 15o (1922). See Federal Trade Commission Report, Resale
Price Maintenance, Summary.and Conclusion, issued December 23, 1945, in which is
stated the following: "Prior to the signing by the President on August 17, 1937, of
the District appropriation bill, to which the Tydings-Miller amendment to the
Federal anti-trust laws had been attached as a rider, decisions in a number of cases
under the Sherman Law and the Federal Trade Commission Act made it clear that
where a manufacturer maintained the resale prices of Ins identified goods by a
system of contracts or equivalent cooperative methods, those contracts were void,
and such methods illegal under the Sherman Law and the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act."
-United States v. Colgate & Company 250 U. S. 300, 39 S. Ct. 465 (1919).
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doing so without overstepping the vague bounds of permissible con-
duct is so remote that it is hardly conceivable the Commission would
impose it as an alternative to violating the Robinson-Patman Act.
34
The seller also may, in all but several States and the District of Colum-
bia, enter into fair trade contracts to maintain his resale price. It is
hardly to be supposed, however, that the Commission has reversed
the position, stated in its recently submitted report to Congress, that
the Miller-Tydings Amendment to the Sherman Act, permitting fair-
trade contracts, is against the policy of the antitrust laws, and that the
essence of resale price maintenance is control of price competition. 35
In view of the Commission's order prohibiting functional discounts
"where" the wholesaler cuts prices, the following language from that
report is of interest:
" In the absence of effective Government supervision in the
public interest, resale price maintenance, legalized to correct
abuses of extreme price competition, is subject to use as a means
of effecting enhancement of prices by secret agreements and re-
straint of competition by coercive action on the part of interested
cooperating trade groups of manufacturers, wholesalers, and re-
tailers in such ways and to such an extent as to make it economi-
cally unsound and undesirable in a competitive economy.
The Tydings-Miller amendment legalizes contracts whose
object is to require all dealers to sell at not less than the resale
price stipulated by contract without reference to their individual
selling costs or selling policies. The Commission believes that
the consumer is not only entitled to competition between rival
products but to competition between dealers of a single pro-
duct."386 [Italics added].
Perhaps the Commission meant that the supplier should urge his
accountants to estimate a functional discount spread that would allow
the wholesaler a discount representing his costs, overhead, and a fair
profit-a discount that would finance his operations, but would not al-
low him to undercut the supplier's retailer price. Each wholesaler's
costs, however, will differ; the supplier could hardly expect to be the
arbiter of a fair profit for wholesalers. Moreover, as stated, the order
"Cf. Article by John D. Haslett, Pricing Policies Lawful under Section 2(a)
of the Robinson-Patman Act, and Competitive, Justifications for Price Discrimina-
tions as Permitted by Section 2(b) of the Act 33 (1947).
'Federal Trade Commission Report, Resale Price Maintenance, Summary and
Conclusion LX, LXI, LXIV (1945).
"'Federal Trade Commission Rteport, Resale Price Maintenance, Summary and
Conclusion, December 13, 1945. Above sections also quoted in Senate Committee
Print. No. 16, Future of Independent Business 43 (January 2, 1947).
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does not prohibit a differential that "permits" price-cutting, but a
differential where the wholesaler cuts prices.
Must the seller cut off all direct retail customers, and sell only to
wholesalers? It hardly seems possible that the Commission desired
Standard Oil to discontinue direct selling to the more-than-three-
hundred independent filling stations it had been supplying in the De-
troit area. Even were all retailers cut off, however, the seller might not
be fully protected. What would be the effect, for example, if a whole-
saler, unbeknownst to the seller, sells some of the product at retail? If
he does so, the price at which he buys would be lower that that of com-
peting retailers buying from other wholesale customers; under the rule
of this order the original seller might be held to have discriminated in
price in violation of the Robinson-Patman Act.
It is not likely either that the Commission meant that Standard
Oil should discontinue sales to all wholesalers. While this is the one
sure way to obey the cease and desist order, it should not lightly be
assumed that there was a desire to abolish wholesalers, or to encourage
direct selling to retailers.
The Commission, in issuing its order in this case had still more
to say to the respondent-
"The above specified requirements of this order are subject,
however, to the following provisos .. (c) that none of the pro-
hibitions of this order shall be taken as inhibiting a lower price
to jobbers than to retailers where respondent thereby makes
only due allowance for its differences in cost of manufacture,
sale or delivery resulting from the different methods or quanti-
ties in which such gasoline is to such purchasers sold or de-
livered." [Italics added].
Had the Commission not written paragraph 6 into its cease and
desist order in this case, the above proviso would have had an under-
standable meaning, despite an ambiguity in the meaning of the word
"jobber." The Commission had found the "jobbers" sold by Standard
Oil to be in part retailers. This being so, the Commission would be
saying in the proviso that differentials between retailers and those
who act partly as retailers are permissible where there is a proper cost
difference in selling or delivering to them.
This would not be a singular position. Unfortunately, the proviso
must be read in the light of paragraph 6 as well as other sections of the
order. From the standpoint of paragraph 6, it means that functional
discounts are permissible (even though they allow wholesalers to cut
prices) if they can be justified by a difference in cost resulting from sell-
ing or delivering to wholesalers and retailers. If this were the only mea-
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sure of a legal functional discount, it safely may be said that there could
be no functional discount in a practical sense. The seller would proba-
bly find it difficult to determine cost differences in selling to wholesalers
and retailers. In many instances, he may find that it will cost less to sup-
ply individual retailers than individual wholesalers, depending on
turnover, size of orders, type of goods distributed, emergency needs and
similar factors. True, he might be able to average the cost of supplying
all his wholesale customers and all his retail customers, and allow a
functional discount reflecting the difference. Whether such a difference
would be permissible, however, probably depends on the size of the in-
dividual cost variations; it might be difficult to justify when such van-
ations are large. In any event the difference in cost of supplying whole-
salers and retailers could not be expected to correspond at all times and
in all cases to the size of a functional differential needed to finance the
wholesaler's operation.
What, it may be asked, will be the effect of the Indiana Standard
order on the single-price system-the charging of one price to all cus-
tomers regardless of their function?
According to the findings of the Commission upon which para-
graph 6 of the Indiana Standard order was based, the Oil Company
was guilty of discrimination only because direct retailers and indirect
retailers paid different prices. If the. proscribed effect exists because
direct retailers pay more than indirect retailers, it would seem to exist
if the opposite is true. Yet, since a wholesaler must charge his cus-
tomers a higher price than he pays his supplier, this is the inevitable
result of the single-price system. Had the Commission held in this
order (as in the Kraft-Phenix order) that the discrimination between
"purchasers" was the price difference paid by the direct and indirect
retailers, the legality of the single-price system would have been placed
in serious doubt. The Commission's findings and order, however, in-
dicate that the discrimination between "purchasers" was the function-
al discount allowed direct buyers. It would follow that a seller charg-
ing one price to all direct customers has not discriminated in price,
regardless of the fact that indirect customers subsequently pay a higher
price than customers who buy direct. This safe method of pricing, thus
seems to remain an available refuge to those selling multiple-function
customers.
One of the minor tragedies of the Indiana Standard order is that
Commissioner Mason failed to apply his dissenting talents on all its
confusing aspects. Mr. Mason was incensed at (among other things)
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the evil effects of pricing according to use, and indeed this is trouble-
some. The businessman-even by the possibly more realistic rules of
the Sherwin-Williams order-is placed under a heavy burden to ascer-
tain from each of his customers the proportion of their divided func-
tions, and to assume some responsibility for keeping the information
up-to-date. Not to mention the premium this rule puts on the dis-
honesty of buyers who see in it an opportunity to lower their costs, it
places the original seller in danger of being a law violater by the act
of his customer in operating outside his normal function. Nor does a
seller know how much exemption from other anti-trust laws he may de-
pend on in trying to make his customers operate only in their estab-
lished function. His lawyer will probably advise him that he can depend
on no exemption. 37 These problems under the theory of the Robinson-
Patman statute cannot be merely ignored. But in view of paragraph 6
of the Commission's order throwing doubt on the legality of the func-
tional discount itself, they fade into relative insignificance.
In what specific manner, Commissioner Mason might have liked to
know, could the respondent obey the cease and desist order without
eliminating a number of small-business customers, or adopting resale
price maintenance contracts?
He might have questioned the Commission about the difference
between this order and those previously issued, affecting functional
discounts, in which no concern was shown for the wholesaler's resale
price. What is the status of these previous orders, and of what value
will they be as guides to lawyers and businessmen?
Obviously no definite conclusion should be drawn from the In-
diana Standard order until it has gone through the process of complete
judicial review. It is to be hoped that the courts will not fail to realize
its implications before decision is rendered. If the paragraph 6 order
is allowed to stand, unmodified or without further explanation, doubt
will be thrown on the practical usability of functional discounts.
The Judiciary Committee of the House in 1936, when the pro-
posed Robinson-Patman Act was being considered, reported-
".... A separate clause safeguarding differentials between dif-
ferent classes of purchasers becomes necessary. Such differentials,
so long as equal treatment is required within the class, do not
'A related problem anses where the seller wishes to sell a customer in one of his
functions at the proper price for that function, but it not interested in the customer's
other functions. Does the right of customer selection permit selecting a multiple-
function customer in one of his functions; or will the doctrine of the case of Luxor,
Ltd., 31 F. T. C. 658 (194o), apply so that section 2(e) of the Robinson-Patman Act
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give rise to the competitive evils at which the bill is aimed, while
to suppress such differentials would produce an unwarranted
disturbance of existing habits of trade."3 8 [Italics added].
That such specific exemption was necessary now appears to be true.
Unless the courts can read the Robinson-Patman Act otherwise, a
large segment of our marketing system may be in for a surprise.t
forces a seller to select a customer for any function the customer wishes to perform
with respect to the sellers product? This problem deserves separate treatment.
1H. R. Rep. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1936).
tThis article was derived in large part from a paper prepared for the Spring
Seminar in "Problems of Trade Regulation" at the New York University School of
Law, conducted by H. Thomas Austern of the Washington, D. C., Bar.
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